The capacity for planning in nonhuman species has long been an interest of many comparative and cognitive psychologists. There is now considerable evidence that at least great apes show both motor planning and planning for future needs in various contexts and modalities. Few studies, however, have investigated planning ability in a monkey species, and most of these exceptions have used computerized procedures. To gain a broader view, in the current study, we tested capuchin monkeys' capacity for motor planning using the "paddle-box" apparatus, a manual maze task originally designed for testing planning skills in apes (Tecwyn, Thorpe, & Chappell, 2013) . This consisted of a box containing different levels of paddles that subjects rotated to drop food into a tube that delivered it to the subject. To evaluate subjects' degree of skill in the task, the initial locations of the food and the final goal (i.e., the "paths" the food could take) were chosen according to the probability of retrieving the reward, starting with those that gave the highest probability of success and moving sequentially to those with the lowest probability. Most subjects solved all levels of difficulty in the task, and capuchin monkeys succeeded as a group in a generalization test with novel paths. These findings demonstrate that some monkeys, like apes, show planning in different contexts and modalities.
In a previous study, Fragaszy and colleagues (2009) tested capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees on a series of computerized alley mazes. In the task, subjects navigated the cursor from a start point through alleys that contained up to five junctions (i.e., "T"s in the alley), with only one possible route that led to the end point. Chimpanzees performed better than the capuchins, making fewer errors and self-correcting them more often. However, in the most recent study of this series, Pan and colleagues (2011) found that following extensive exposure to a large set of mazes that they repeatedly solved, capuchin monkeys performed comparably to chimpanzees (i.e., they learned to move away from the goal at a "T" junction). Fragaszy and colleagues (2009) also investigated how maze presentation influenced performance in the task. Half of each species was presented with the mazes in an ordered sequence, from simplest to most difficult, whereas the other half received the mazes in a random sequence. Subjects that received the ordered sequence performed overall better (i.e., made fewer errors) than those tested on the random sequence, and the effect was greater for capuchin monkeys than for chimpanzees, indicating that monkeys benefited more from learning the mazes in ascending order of difficulty.
More recently, Beran and colleagues (2015) tested four primate species-human children (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees, rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), and capuchin monkeys-in a different computerized maze task. The task was similar to a previous manual maze task designed by Völter and Call (2014a) and Tecwyn et al. (2013) , in which subjects had to manipulate platforms located at different levels to drop a food from the top level to the bottom level of the maze, where the reward could be retrieved. In the study by Beran et al. (2015) , subjects had to move a cursor to the left or right on a "bar" on the screen until it reached a gap and "dropped" onto the next lower level of bars. Subjects were tested in four phases, starting with Phase 1, which had the easiest mazes (with one level of bars), and working up to Phase 4, which had the most difficult mazes (with four levels of bars). Although all species were good at solving the task, some differences emerged; first, chimpanzees took generally fewer trials than monkeys to reach the learning criterion in each phase (e.g., 16 -108 trials vs. 43-860 trials in Phase 1), and they also had more correct trials in the final phase (74.1%-88.9% vs. 38%-77.7% in Phase 4). Second, chimpanzees were overall more proficient than the macaques and capuchins at reversing the direction of the cursor and moving it away from the target when necessary (monkeys particularly struggled with this), indicating that the chimpanzees were particularly efficient at anticipating trouble spots (Fragaszy et al., 2003 .
Finding species differences in performance, as in the works by Fragaszy et al. (2009) and Beran et al. (2015) , is particularly important for two reasons. First, it allows us to evaluate each species' level of skill and situate it in a broader comparative and evolutionary frame, and second, it helps to pinpoint the possible mechanisms involved in planning behavior in primates, which is, again, important for comparing species. To help with such comparisons, Fragaszy et al. (2003) identified five levels of planning using a computerized maze procedure, each level being characterized by one strategy (or set of rules) used to solve the task. At Level 0, subjects navigate the cursor through the maze using apparently random movements; that is, they do not show any planning behavior. Level 1 is more sophisticated than Level 0 in that subjects follow more specific directions (e.g., go straight or turn on a one-way route); however, they still choose randomly when given the choice between two or more routes.
In the subsequent levels, however, subjects seem to make choices based on at least one rule. At Level 2, they follow the single rule "direction toward the goal"; that is, they choose the route that connects most directly start and target locations. Although this strategy implies that subjects "look ahead," it does not require them to scan the entire image of the maze to make a choice. Previous studies have suggested that both capuchins and chimpanzees have the propensity to use this strategy, although it seems to be more frequently used in monkeys (Fragaszy et al., 2003 . At Level 3, subjects use two rules before making a choice; they look down toward the target (as in Level 2), while evaluating the continuity of the route. This is somewhat more cognitively demanding than previous levels because it requires paying attention to the route to take at each choice point. It has been proposed that chimpanzees' better performance than capuchins in trials where they have to move the cursor away from the goal is due to Level-3 planning ; although with more extensive experience, capuchins, too, show evidence of Level-3 planning; Pan et al., 2011) .
Finally, at Level 4, subjects use some higher cognitive mechanism, like backward or forward induction, to solve the task. Backward induction (first introduced by von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944 ) is a problem-solving strategy that consists of analyzing a problem from back to front to determine what sequence of optimal actions is required to solve it. Evidence of this capacity in animals was first demonstrated in a chimpanzee, Julia, using a tool-use procedure (Döhl, 1968) . In this study, Julia learned to open 10 transparent boxes in the appropriate sequence, using specific tools that she could find inside each box, to retrieve a food reward at the end. Importantly, because each tool was only accessible after the box was open, and each could only open one other box, Julia had to have the knowledge of the full sequence of boxes in a reverse order before making her first choice to succeed (hence, backward induction).
In a previous study, we hypothesized that one possibility for why capuchin monkeys had difficulty solving a sequential twochoice task was that they failed to use planning (Salwiczek et al., 2012) . In the task, choosing Plate A gave monkeys access to a food reward on Plate A as well as Plate B (which resulted in two rewards, i.e., the food maximizing solution), whereas choosing Plate B gave them access only to the reward on Plate B (which resulted in one reward only). Therefore, maximizing food intake required taking the future consequences of a given choice into account, which previous studies indicate that capuchins should be capable of doing (for delayed rewards experiments, see Addessi, Paglieri, & Focaroli, 2011; Bramlett, Perdue, Evans, & Beran, 2012 ; for planning and sequential learning experiments, see Beran & Parrish, 2012) . However, in typical studies on planning, subjects receive the reward only if they succeed in completing the entire task. A key difference in Salwiczek et al.'s (2012) task is that subjects got an immediate reward from the suboptimal option (Plate B); that is, choosing B first may have interfered with learning, in that blocking or overshadowing may have lowered the incentive value of the reward for the optimal option (Plate A; Salwiczek et al., 2012) . Another possibility is that planning is easier in computerized tasks than in manual tasks, because the food This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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rewards are not visible during the actual test (Prétôt, Bshary, & Brosnan, 2016a; Prétôt, Bshary, & Brosnan, 2016b ). In the current study, we tested this latter possibility by giving subjects a manualbased planning task that, like typical planning studies, only resulted in the reward at the end of the task, but for which the food was visible the entire time. One particularly clever design by Tecwyn et al. (2013) tested planning in orangutans and bonobos using a "paddle-box" apparatus, which consists of a clear box with three levels of paddles that subjects had to rotate to drop a food reward into one of four openings located at the bottom of the box (subjects could directly retrieve it from there). Critically, the procedure differed from previous computerized tasks in that decisions were not correctable (e.g., subjects could not reverse directions), which aimed to help subjects make a correct choice at their first attempt or plan for the correct solution (Tecwyn et al., 2012) . Tecwyn and colleagues found that most subjects succeeded in the task when the paddles were set up in a flat orientation (although they failed when the paddles were initially positioned in diagonal orientations) and that their performance was comparable with 4-and 5-year-old human children tested in the same procedure (Tecwyn et al., 2014) .
Such a procedure presented numerous advantages as compared with the tool-use and computer-based tests of planning. First, unlike tool-use tasks, the paddle-box task is quite intuitive for primates, with the action of the primate directly impacting the movement of the reward in real time. In addition, it does not depend on species-specific behaviors or competencies, nor does it involve any complex tool-use skill (although capuchins do use tools, using tools may be challenging because it increases cognitive load and leads to decreased performance; Seed, Call, Emery, & Clayton, 2009; Völter & Call, 2014b) . Second, although computerized procedures can be valuable because they allow for extremely tight control of variables, using a manual procedure can be particularly useful in that there is more direct haptic feedback, and in the case of the paddle-box task, it provides subjects with a more direct association between the object that carries the food reward (apparatus) and the release of the reward, which reduces both physical and temporal distance between the subject and the reward (Tecwyn et al., 2013) . Finally, it is always important to test species using multiple modalities to determine both the extent and limits of their cognitive capacities.
Another benefit from the paddle-box procedure is that it maps on to capuchins' strengths. Capuchin monkeys are highly manipulative and object-oriented primates and are particularly good at using tools to process embedded foods in the wild (called "extractive foraging"); for example, they pound palm trees to acquire pith and use stones to crack open nuts (Ferreira, Emidio, & Jerusalinsky, 2010; Fragaszy, Izar, Visalberghi, Ottoni, & de Oliveira, 2004; Moura & Lee, 2004 ; for similar results in an experimental setup, see Visalberghi et al., 2009) , which implies that they should be good at object manipulation tasks such as this. However, one difference with apes, who are also excellent tool users, is that they usually do not use tools in as broad of a set of situations (e.g., chimpanzees: Sabbatini et al., 2012; orangutans: Fox, Sitompul, & van Schaik, 1999; van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996) . This could be due to reduced cognitive flexibility as compared with apes (Deaner, van Schaik, & Johnson, 2006) , but whatever the underlying cognitive difference, although we expect capuchin monkeys to perform well in the paddle-box task, we do not expect their performance to match that of the apes.
In the current study, capuchin monkey subjects were tested for planning in the paddle-box task based on the design by Tecwyn et al. (2013) . There were three levels of paddles and, accordingly, three degrees of difficulty to retrieve the food reward. If the monkeys showed planning, they should have anticipated which way to turn the paddles to release the reward. If they failed to follow the correct route, the reward was lost. Note that although our procedure was based on the work of Tecwyn and colleagues, the two studies differed in some aspects, which we discuss in the Method section. Based on capuchins' performance in previous maze studies, and in particular those operating visually like the paddle-box task (Beran et al., 2015) , we predicted that monkeys would eventually reach the learning criterion at all three degrees of difficulty. However, because they show less broad range of tooluse behaviors and apparently lower level planning than the apes ), we predicted they would take more trials than orangutans and bonobos to learn the task (Tecwyn et al., 2013) . We did, however, predict that they would ultimately pass a final generalization test, indicating that they understood the task.
Method

Subjects and Housing
We tested 10 captive-born brown capuchin monkeys (five male, average age: 13.4 years, range ϭ 8 -18 years; five female, average age: 14.4 years, range ϭ 8 -19 years) from two long-term, stable, mixed-sex social groups housed at the Language Research Center of Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States. One subject was dropped because she often chose not to participate, resulting in a total sample size of nine individuals. Among the nine remaining subjects, seven had participated previously in Beran et al.'s (2015) computerized maze study. Subjects were always housed with their social groups, except when they separated voluntarily for behavioral and cognitive testing. They were fed a diet according to their species-specific needs that included primate chow and fresh fruits and vegetables. They also received enrichment foods several times per day. Animals were never deprived of food or water for testing purposes, nor were the foods given or feeding schedules ever altered, regardless of subjects' participation in testing. Running water was available ad libitum, including during testing. All of the capuchin monkey experiments were approved by the Georgia State University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (A16031) and met the ethical standards of the United States and the American Society of Primatologists. Georgia State University is fully accredited by the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care International (AAALAC).
The monkeys lived in two large indoor/outdoor enclosures. Each enclosure contained ample three-dimensional climbing space as well as trapezes, perches, and enrichment items. The enclosure for each social group was divided into an indoor area and a larger outdoor area (approximately one half to two thirds of their total space). The subjects had previously been trained to voluntarily enter testing boxes attached to their indoor area, which allowed us to separate individuals from their group for testing. They could choose not to participate at any time by walking away from the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
experimenter, and there were no consequences for the monkeys if they decided not to participate. No subject was ever involved in more than one session of this test on any given day.
Differences With Tecwyn et al.'s Procedure
We made three changes as compared with Tecwyn et al.'s (2013) procedure, which were chosen to maximize our ability to interpret subjects' performance in the task. First, unlike in the procedure by Tecwyn et al., our subjects received trials that incrementally increased in difficulty (i.e., they started with the least difficult trials and then received trials that were increasingly difficult), which we hypothesized would help them learn the task more quickly . Also, subjects were only tested in subsequent degrees of difficulty after they reached the learning criterion in prior degrees, which allowed us to know for each individual the number of trials necessary to succeed (or fail) in the task (for a similar approach, see Beran et al., 2015) . Second, they never received trials that had different degrees of difficulty within a same testing session (except for the generalization test), which allowed us to better evaluate their performance at any particular degree of difficulty. Third, all of our statistical tests were two-tailed (including those with a binomial proportion lower than 0.5), which provided a more robust analysis and interpretation of the data.
Apparatus
Subjects were tested using a paddle-box apparatus (based on Tecwyn et al., 2013;  Figure 1 ), which consisted of a clear acrylic box (approximately 60 ϫ 45 cm) containing paddles, on which the food reward was initially placed, that subjects rotated using handles. If they rotated the paddles properly, they could drop the reward into a funnel that allowed them to access it. The funnel was connected to one of four openings (A-D; Figure 1 ), so subjects had to plan their route to the funnel appropriately to receive the reward. Rewards were 1-g banana-flavor precision pellets (Bio-Serv, Flemington, NJ). Subjects could only obtain the reward from the opening connected to the funnel, which was large enough for the pellet to go through but too small for monkeys' hands to reach through. The whole system was mounted vertically on a computer cart. Subjects were tested individually in a large testing cage (70 ϫ 70 ϫ 60 cm) and would activate the handles through five large horizontal slits (55 ϫ 5 cm) cut in a clear polycarbonate front to the testing cage.
The paddle-box apparatus had three levels of paddles (Levels 1-3), all of which could be rotated to the left or right (except during the learning phase; see Learning Trials). The first level consisted of three paddles that were directly above the funnel, so that only a single rotation was needed to acquire the food reward ( Figure 1 ). The second level consisted of two paddles that could be turned to drop the reward into a paddle of the first level; following this, the subject could rotate the Level-1 paddle to drop the reward into the funnel (if the reward was in the appropriate paddle) to retrieve it. A reward placed on the second level required two rotations, and hence offered more opportunities to make a mistake. Finally, the third level consisted of three paddles that could be turned to drop the reward into a paddle on the second level, which the subject could then rotate to drop the reward into the first level, from which it could be retrieved via the funnel. This required three rotations and offered the lowest probability of success if the monkeys turned the paddles at random. Note that at any point on any level, subjects could send the reward in the wrong direction, which was always irreversible (see Tecwyn et al., 2013 , for a discussion on the effect of error correctability on performance).
Testing Procedure
Before a trial, the experimenter placed the food reward on a predetermined paddle. A trial began once the subject was presented the apparatus and rotated the paddle containing the reward, at which point the experimenter stepped back (to minimize experimenter cueing). Each trial ended once the reward was retrieved through the funnel (correct trials), lost by dropping on the bottom of the cart or the floor (incorrect trials), or still located on any paddle after 60 s (also considered as incorrect trials; this occurred only in a few trials at the beginning of the study, likely due to subjects' lack of experience with the apparatus). Each trial was video-recorded and its outcome (correct or incorrect) was checked for accuracy after each session. We then calculated Cohen's kappa Figure 1 . Paddle-box apparatus (based on Tecwyn et al., 2013) . Each paddle (1-8) was controlled by a handle that subjects rotated to drop the food reward into a funnel connected to one of four openings (A-D). Here, the reward could only be retrieved through Opening B. Figure 1a is a diagram and Figure 1b is a photograph of the actual apparatus. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
(k) to test for interrater reliability (IRR). There was an almost perfect agreement between the two coders for the outcome of each trial (k ϭ 0.999; p Ͻ .001), with raters agreeing on 1,858 of the 1,859 trials total (99.95%). The unique trial of disagreement concerned one subject's trial in Phase 4. To evaluate subjects' degree of skill in the task, we had to first calculate the probability of retrieving the reward for each path (i.e., the route between where the reward was initially placed and the funnel). We used paths with 50%, 25%, and 12.5% probability of retrieving the reward (see Table S1 in the online supplemental materials). This excluded 14 paths; 10 paths that had 0% of success (1-C, 1-D, 2-A, 2-D, 3-A, 3-B, 4-D, 5-A, 6-D, and 8-A), two paths that had 37.5% of success because there was only one starting paddle location for which this probability held (see Counterbalancing Scheme), and two paths that were too ambiguous because they led to unpredictable outcomes (6-A and 8-D; see Table S1 in the online supplemental materials). For example, with Path 8-D, if the subject rotated the paddle clockwise, we could not predict (nor could the monkeys) whether the reward would drop directly into the funnel, or skip Paddle 5 and fall onto Paddle 3 and be retrieved, or roll too far on the right and be lost by dropping on the floor of the cart.
All subjects were tested first on paths that had the highest probability of success (i.e., Paddles 1-3, on the lowest level of the apparatus, requiring a single rotation) and moved sequentially to those that gave the lowest probability of success. Subjects could not move on until they had met the criterion on the current phase of testing. Specifically, subjects were tested in up to five phases, starting with Phase 1, which had the lowest degree of difficulty (50% chance of receiving the reward) and the lowest level of paddles (one level), and working up to higher levels of difficulty (with only 12.5% chance of receiving the reward in Phase 5; see Table S2 in the online supplemental materials). Although different phases sometimes started with the reward on the same paddle, the chance of retrieving it differed even with the reward starting on the same level, according to the location of the funnel. For example, Phase 2 and Phase 3 both involved the reward starting on the second level of paddles; however, in Phase 2, the reward could be dropped onto either of the lower level paddles and still result in success (there were two possible routes to retrieve it), so the only consequential decision was the second rotation (Level 1). On the other hand, in Phase 3, subjects had to plan in advance which direction to drop the reward, as only one of the lower paddles could reach the funnel (there was only one possible route, thus a lower chance to retrieve it). If they made the wrong decision on the first rotation, then it was impossible to get the reward. Within each phase, only the paddles that were on the same level and that had the same probability of releasing the reward were used. Subjects received one six-trial session per day and were tested in up to 15 sessions in each phase (unless otherwise specified).
Counterbalancing Scheme
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups (A, B, or C) so that all subjects within the same group received trials with identical paths, but the different groups received trials with different paths (see Table S2 in the online supplemental materials). For each group, we selected paths following three criteria that maximized subjects' exposure to different paths while saving new ones for the generalization test (see following section). First, each subject saw only two of the possible paths in each phase (each three times, for the total of six trials per phase), so that the remaining paths, if any, could be used in the generalization test. For example, Phase 1 had six possible paths (1-A, 1-B, 2-B, 2-C, 3-C, and 3-D; see Table S2 in the online supplemental materials), so each group received two different paths three times each. Phase 2 had only two possible paths (4-B and 5-C), so all subjects received those paths. Second, the two paths had to require subjects to rotate the paddles evenly to the left and the right. For example, for one group, Phase 1 had three trials with Path 1-A, which required a rotation to the left side, and three trials with Path 2-C, which required a rotation to the right side. Third, the two paths always involved different start paddles (which excluded the paths that gave 37.5% of probability to succeed); for example, Phase 1 had three trials with the reward starting on Paddle 1 and three trials with the reward starting on Paddle 2.
Generalization Test
Subjects that succeeded in all phases of the task (N ϭ 7) were then given a generalization test, consisting of three sessions of six familiar and unfamiliar trials (i.e., novel paths that they would not have experienced in any previous phase; see Table S2 in the online supplemental materials). Each subject received eight unfamiliar trials and 10 familiar trials (i.e., 18 trials each, for a total of 126 trials). The first and second sessions had three pairs of trials with paths from all three degrees of difficulty (and all three levels of paddles), each pair made of one unfamiliar trial and one familiar trial from Phase 1, Phase 3, or Phase 5. Because there were not enough new unfamiliar trials remaining after the second session, the third and final session was made of only two unfamiliar trials with paths from the first level of paddles and two pairs of familiar trials with paths from the two other levels (Levels 2 and 3).
Limitation to the Procedure
As in the study by Tecwyn et al. (2013) , the reward occasionally ended up in an unexpected location (e.g., on a different paddle, stuck on a paddle, or accidentally lost by jumping out of the apparatus). This mostly occurred when a subject rotated the paddle too quickly or slowly or when a paddle did not function properly (because it was too tight or loose). When this happened, the experimenter withdrew the apparatus as quickly as possible before the trial ended and restarted the trial (although in a few occasions, the subject was fast enough to grab the reward before the experimenter could take the apparatus away). This accounted for fewer than 2% of the total trials of the study.
Another downside of the paddle-box procedure is that, unlike computerized maze tasks (which can generate a large number of different paths), it was more difficult to rule out the possibility that subjects solved the task by simply directing the paddle toward the funnel (i.e., Fragaszy et al.'s Level 2 of planning). However, Tecwyn and colleagues reported that their subjects used different routes, sometimes turning the start paddle away from the goal (E. Tecwyn, personal observation). In our study, there were two paths (6-B and 8-C) in which subjects could choose between a route that apparently led toward the funnel and another that apparently led away from the funnel; this allowed us to investigate, to some This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
degree, whether capuchin monkeys showed the same flexibility as the orangutans in the previous study. Specifically, with Path 6-B, subjects had to drop the reward from Paddle 6 to Paddle 4, and then choose between Paddle 1 (Route 1) and Paddle 2 (Route 2). Although both routes lead to reward retrieval, Route 1's trajectory (i.e., the line from Paddle 6 to Paddle 1) consistently leads the reward toward the funnel, whereas Route 2's trajectory (i.e., the line from Paddle 6 to Paddle 2) initially leads the reward away from the funnel. Therefore, if we assume that subjects use the rule "direct paddle toward the funnel," we would expect them to choose Route 1 over Route 2. We used the same logic for Path 8-C, in which subjects had to drop the reward from Paddle 8 to Paddle 5, and then choose between Paddle 3 (i.e., Route 1, which leads toward the funnel) and Paddle 2 (i.e., Route 2, which leads away from the funnel).
To explore this, we assessed whether subjects used Route 1 or Route 2 in trials with Paths 6-B and 8-C. We then calculated Cohen's k to test for IRR on the assessment of which route the subject used. Note that, for this analysis, we dropped the unique trial of disagreement from our previous IRR test; that is, we used 136 of the 137 total trials of Phase 4. There was a perfect agreement between the two coders for the choice of route in each trial (k ϭ 1.000; p Ͻ .001), with raters agreeing on all 136 trials (100%).
Learning Trials
Four of the nine subjects tested in Phase 1 reached the learning criterion within 10 sessions (see following section). The other five subjects that did not solve the task showed a robust side bias in Sessions 6 -10 (two-tailed exact binomial test: all ps Ͻ 0.001). In an attempt to eliminate the side bias, subjects received five learning sessions of six forced trials each, directly following Session 10. In those trials, a T-shaped pipe that functioned as a blocker was inserted between paddles, requiring the subject to rotate the paddle toward their less-preferred side to retrieve the reward. Because each learning trial was designed to always lead to a correct outcome, subjects always retrieved the reward. Following the learning phase, subjects were tested again on up to 15 sessions of Phase 1 (without the learning trials). No subsequent learning trials were used.
Learning Criterion and Statistics
We used a learning criterion to ensure all individuals had a similar comprehension of the task. The learning criterion for all tests was based on a two-tailed exact binomial test and corresponded to the minimum number of correct trials needed to be statistically significantly different from chance. In Phases 1-5, for those paths that gave a 50% probability of success, subjects needed two consecutive sessions of at least 5/6 correct trials each (twotailed exact binomial test, p ϭ .04) to reach the learning criterion. For the paths that gave 25% and 12.5% of chance to succeed, subjects needed, respectively, two consecutive sessions of at least 4/6 correct trials each (25%; binomial test, p Ͻ .01) and 3/6 correct trials each (12.5%; binomial test, p Ͻ .01) to reach the learning criterion. Note that subjects always completed every session leading up to the criterion, even if their performance early in the session meant that they met the criterion (i.e., they got their first three to five trials correct). Although our criterion limited subjects to 15 sessions, if a subject did 5/6 correct trials in the last session (i.e., Session 15), it was given another set of six trials to maximize its chances of reaching the criterion. This happened to one subject in Phase 1 (Table 1) .
In the generalization test, there were too few unfamiliar trials at the individual level for statistical significance, so we reported the percentage of correct unfamiliar trials (i.e., out of eight trials) for each subject. At the group level, we used the total number of unfamiliar trials across all subjects for each of the three degrees of difficulty, that is, 28 trials with paths that had 50% probability of success and 14 trials with paths that had 25% and 12.5% probabilities of success. For those trials with paths that had a 50% probability of success, subjects as a group reached the criterion if they got at least 20/28 trials correct (two-tailed exact binomial test, p ϭ .04). For the paths that gave 25% and 12.5% probability of success, subjects as a group needed, respectively, at least 8/14 correct trials (25%; binomial test, p ϭ .02) and at least 5/14 correct trials to reach the criterion (12.5%; binomial test, p ϭ .05). As with the individual analyses, our criteria were based on two-tailed probabilities.
In addition to descriptive data, we conducted four quantitative comparisons. For these analyses, we only used the data of subjects that completed all phases of the task, including the generalization test (i.e., N ϭ 7). First, we used a two-tailed exact Friedman test to compare subjects' learning performance across multiple phases. To do this, we looked at subjects' number of trials needed to reach the criterion across the five phases. For post hoc analyses, we used a two-tailed exact Wilcoxon signed-rank test with a Bonferroni correction, resulting in a significance level set at p Ͻ .005.
Second, we used a two-tailed exact Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare subjects' performance in the generalization test on familiar versus unfamiliar trials (i.e., if they perform similarly on unfamiliar trials, this implies that they understand how the apparatus works). Because of the small number of trials per subject, we also looked at performance at the group level. To do this, we used Note. A minimum of 12 trials was required to meet the criterion in all phases. The group to which each subject was assigned (A, B, or C) is indicated in parentheses. a Subject received only five trials in one of the sessions. b Subject received five learning sessions of six forced trials before being tested again in Phase 1. This number includes the original 60 trials and those subsequent to the learning trials, but not the learning trials.
c Subject did 5/6 correct trials in the last session, and so was given an additional set of six trials.
d The group mean (M) only includes subjects who reached the learning criterion in the phase. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
a two-tailed exact Fisher's test to compare the total number of correct unfamiliar trials versus familiar trials. In addition, we used a binary logistic model, a form of generalized linear model, to explore possible factors related to success in the generalization test (for similar approaches, see Fragaszy et al., 2003 Fragaszy et al., , 2009 Tecwyn et al., 2013) . This model assumes a binomial distribution of binary data. We examined the main effects of five independent variables of interest listed later on the likelihood to succeed in the 126 total trials of the generalization test. We used Wald's chi-square to evaluate the probability of the observed distribution. The model included, for each trial, the variables Subject Group (whether subjects were from Group A, B, or C), Trial Novelty (whether the trial was unfamiliar or familiar), Trial Phase (whether the trial was from Phase 1, Phase 3, or Phase 5), and Trial Experience (the number of trials with the same path received in the testing phases). Note that although other researchers have used generalized linear models to look at learning in the testing phases (Fragaszy et al., 2003 Tecwyn et al., 2013) , as we trained to the criterion rather than using a set number of trials, this was not an appropriate analysis in our case. Third, we used a two-tailed exact Fisher's test to compare subjects' performance before and after they received multiple exposures to the same paths (as a measure of the effect of experience). To do this, we looked at the number of correct trials in the first six familiar trials of the generalization test (i.e., for Group A: 1A, 2C, 4C, 5D, 7D, and 8B; for Group B: 1B, 3C, 4A, 5B, 6C, and 7A; for Group C: 2B, 3D, 4C, 5B, 6C, and 8B) as compared with the first six trials with the same paths in the testing phases (i.e., when first presented in the task).
Fourth, we used a two-tailed exact Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to evaluate whether subjects used the single rule "direction toward the funnel" to solve trials in Phase 4 (see Fragaszy et al.' s Level 2 of planning). To do this, we looked at subjects' percentage of trials in which they retrieved the reward using the route whose trajectory led toward the funnel as compared with the route that led away from the funnel, either on the last two sessions only (i.e., when they reached the criterion) or in all sessions of the phase (regardless of whether they reached the criterion). We only included the correct trials for this analysis.
Finally, although our procedure differed from Tecwyn et al.'s (2013) study in some respects (see earlier), we provided a qualitative comparison of performance between capuchin monkeys and orangutans and bonobos. We statistically compared species' performance in three phases, Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3, which were equivalent to, respectively, the "1 step, 1 solution," the "2 steps, 1 solution," and the "3 steps, 1 solution" phases in Tecwyn et al.'s work (see Tecwyn et al.'s Table S1 in the online supplemental materials). As in our study, Tecwyn and colleagues used a two-tailed binomial test in Phase 1 (for a binomial proportion of 0.5) but used a one-tailed test for all the other phases (for binomial proportions lower than 0.5). For a more robust analysis, we chose to use the two-tailed values for all subjects in all phases.
Results
Phases 1-5
Four of the nine subjects used for the analysis reached the criterion for Phase 1 within 60 trials (range ϭ 18 -60 trials, M Ϯ SD ϭ 34.50 Ϯ 18.57 trials; see Table 1 and Figure S1 in the online supplemental materials). Three of the other five subjects did so after they received the learning trials (range ϭ 72-78 trials, M Ϯ SD ϭ 74 Ϯ 3.46 trials; note that the range includes the initial 60 trials and the trials subsequent to the learning trials, but not the 30 learning trials, which were forced choice). The last two subjects never reached the criterion in Phase 1, after 150 and 156 trials, respectively (again not counting the 30 learning trials).
All seven subjects who passed Phase 1 reached the criterion in all subsequent phases in 72 or fewer trials on each phase (there were no additional learning trials in any phase; Phase 2: range ϭ 12-72 trials, M Ϯ SD ϭ 36 Ϯ 22. Our comparison revealed that there was an overall significant difference in learning speed across phases, with subjects learning more rapidly in subsequent phases (two-tailed exact Friedman test: df ϭ 4, H ϭ 10.15, N ϭ 7, p ϭ .03; Table 1 ), but none of the post hoc comparisons was significant (two-tailed exact Wilcoxon's test: all ps Ն 0.03, Bonferroni adjusted p value ϭ 0.005).
Generalization Test
At the individual level, one subject was correct on 8/8 unfamiliar trials (100%; Table 2), two on 7/8 (87.5%), two on 6/8 (75%), Note. There were three unfamiliar trials in Session 1-2 and two in Session 3. a Because of an issue with the apparatus, the subject was given one trial again at the end of the session. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
one on 5/8 (62.5%), and one on 4/8 (50%). Taken as a group, monkeys reached the learning criterion in all three degrees of difficulty of the test; they were correct on 25/28 trials in the lower degree of difficulty (50%; two-tailed exact binomial test, p Ͻ .001), 12/14 in the intermediate degree (25%; binomial test, p Ͻ .001), and 8/14 in the higher degree (12.5%; binomial test, p Ͻ .001).
Our comparisons revealed no difference in learning performance between unfamiliar and familiar trials in the generalization test, either at the individual level (two-tailed exact Wilcoxon's test: Z ϭ Ϫ0.11, W ϭ 10, N ϭ 7, p ϭ 1.00; Table 2) or at the group level (43 unfamiliar trials correct out of 56 trials total, and 51 familiar trials correct out of 70 trials total; two-tailed exact Fisher's test: p ϭ .68).
The results of the full binary logistic model indicated that there was a collective significant effect of the variables on the subjects' likelihood to succeed in the generalization trials, 2 (df ϭ 6, N ϭ 126) ϭ 14.93, p ϭ .02. The analysis revealed that subjects performed better in the generalization trials of Phase 1 than in the generalization trials of Phase 5, although the difference was only marginally significant, 2 (df ϭ 1) ϭ 3.78, p ϭ .052. None of the other comparisons was significant (all ps Ն 0.07).
Effect of Experience
As a group, monkeys performed better after they received repeated exposures to the same paths (31 trials correct out of 42 trials total) than when first presented with these paths (13 trials correct out of 42 trials total; two-tailed exact Fisher's test: p Ͻ .001; see Table S3 in the online supplemental materials).
Choice of Route in Phase 4
Subjects did not choose one route over the other in Phase 4; they chose the route with the trajectory leading toward the funnel in 35 trials out of 68 trials total in the last two sessions (two-tailed exact Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: D ϭ 0.78, N ϭ 7, p ϭ .50; see Table  S4 in the online supplemental materials), and in 66 trials out of 137 trials total when including all sessions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: D ϭ 0.59, N ϭ 7, p ϭ .82).
Capuchins Versus Orangutans and Bonobos
Test sessions were run somewhat differently for the capuchins and the apes, so to compare the two groups, we compared how many trials it took capuchins to reach the criterion (which was based on the two-tailed exact binomial test) to the number of trials correct out of the total number of trials given for the apes (who were given a set number of trials; Tecwyn et al., 2013) . One of the seven capuchins who met Phase 1 reached the criterion within 18 trials (M ϭ 51.43; Table 3 ), whereas six of the seven orangutans did so within 16 trials (M ϭ 14.83; the numbers are different because of a different number of trials per session), and two of the three bonobos did so within 20 trials (M ϭ 17). In addition, none of the seven capuchins who met Phase 3 reached the criterion within 12 trials (M ϭ 30.86), whereas five of the seven orangutans did so within 12 trials (M ϭ 9.6), and two of the three bonobos did so within 16 trials (M ϭ 11). Finally, three of the seven capuchins who met Phase 5 reached the criterion within 12 trials (M ϭ 24), whereas all seven orangutans did so within eight trials (M ϭ 5.71), and two of three bonobos did so within 10 trials (M ϭ 6). Overall, capuchins had more trials than the apes (excluding the apes' previous trials with the paddles positioned in diagonal orientations), because the capuchins took longer to reach the criterion, so the three capuchins in Phase 5 had had more experience than the orangutans and bonobos with whom we compared them.
Discussion
Previous studies showing evidence of planning in capuchin monkeys have used computerized procedures. To see if this generalized to new contexts, we tested whether capuchins showed planning in a manual maze procedure. We used an adapted version of the paddle-box task, an apparatus originally designed for apes by Tecwyn and colleagues (2013) . The system, which allowed for Note. For capuchins (Cebus), this number corresponds to the number of correct trials they needed to reach our criterion (based on a two-tailed exact binomial test), whereas for orangutans (Pongo) and bonobos (Pan) , it corresponds to the number of correct trials out of the total number of trials given (whether they reached the criterion or not). Orangutans and bonobos' data are based on Tecwyn et al. (2013;  see Table S1 in their online supplemental materials). a Subject did not reach the learning criterion (based on either a one-tailed or two-tailed binomial test). b The total number of trials was too small to calculate statistical significance.
c The mean (M) only includes subjects who reached the learning criterion in the phase using a two-tailed exact binomial test (this applied to all species). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
varying degrees of difficulty, consisted of paddles that subjects had to rotate in the correct pattern to drop a food reward through a funnel, and thereby gain access to it. As we predicted, capuchin monkeys performed relatively well in the task; all seven subjects who passed Phase 1 (the easiest phase, with a single decision and a 50% chance of being correct) ultimately passed Phase 5 (the most difficult phase, with three sequential decisions). In addition, as a group, they solved the generalization trials, which involved novel pathways. This capacity for generalizing to novel problems has been suggested as a potential indicator of the capuchins' high levels of adaptability and flexibility, which allows them to exploit a variety of resources and habitats in both captive and natural settings (Fragaszy, Visalberghi, & Robinson, 1990; Visalberghi, 1990 ; for evidence of generalization in the lab, see Fujita, Sato, & Kuroshima, 2011; Prétôt et al., 2016a; Truppa et al., 2010 ; for evidence in the wild, see Barrett, McElreath, & Perry, 2017; Fragaszy, Visalberghi, & Fedigan, 2004; Perry, Barrett, & Godoy, 2017) .
Although they could successfully generalize, monkeys as a group did better after they had repeated exposures to the same paths, implying that overall performance in the task improves with experience. Similar results have been previously reported in another population of capuchins (Pan et al., 2011 ; also see Fragaszy et al., 2009) ; in this study, monkeys showed improved performance in novel mazes after they received extended practice on a large set of repeated mazes. These results emphasize the importance of taking previous experience into account when interpreting data, and in particular when comparing subjects across different studies and conditions.
As expected, capuchin monkeys needed more trials to solve the task than orangutans did, even at the lowest degree of difficulty (the same appears to be true for bonobos, although the very small number of bonobos tested makes comparisons difficult). These findings add to the corpus of studies that indicate more limited planning capacities in capuchin monkeys than in apes ). Although our study cannot address why monkeys differed from apes, previous studies have suggested that differences in general inhibitory control (Fragaszy et al., 2003 Tecwyn et al., 2013) , focused attention , overall brain size (Deaner, Isler, Burkart, & van Schaik, 2007 ; but see Healy & Rowe, 2013) , and/or social systems (Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2008) might explain difference in general performance in cognitive tests between monkeys and apes (Beran et al., 2015 ; also see Beran & Hopkins, 2018 , for a recent study on the link between general intelligence and self-control in chimpanzees).
Unfortunately, testing for inhibitory control was difficult in our study, because our paddle-box procedure contained too few trials in which subjects had to turn the paddles away from the funnel to provide a proper analysis. Therefore, it is possible that apes were better than capuchin monkeys at inhibiting their desire to move toward the goal even when it was ultimately a path leading to the loss of the food (as it was the case in the computerized tasks). We note, however, that on those few trials in which they could do so, the monkeys did not show a bias toward turning the paddles preferentially in the direction of the funnel, implying that this was not a problem for them. Although we can only speculate as to why capuchins struggled less with moving away from the target in the paddle-box task than in the computerized tasks, it is possible that the lack of opportunity to correct an error (e.g., using direction reversal) in the paddle-box task increased subjects' motivation to make the correct decision in the first place (Tecwyn et al., 2012 (Tecwyn et al., , 2013 .
We see at least two other (nonmutually exclusive) possibilities that could explain the species' difference in the task. First, the capuchins might be worse than the apes at visualizing the possible pathways; that is, they may have attended to one level at a time, whereas the apes may have scanned the whole maze and evaluated its continuity before making a decision. However, we also note that if this was the case, it seems unlikely that the capuchins' success would have been as great when the food reward started on the third and highest level of paddles. Second, it may be that capuchins are simply less cognitively flexible than the apes. For an example of this in another context, capuchin monkeys are proficient tool users (a skill that might help to learn how to operate the paddle-box apparatus), but their tool-use repertoire is generally more limited than the one of chimpanzees and orangutans. Thus, although they are clearly able to learn these tasks, if they are less cognitively flexible, they may require additional experience to do so.
Finally, there was substantial variability in performance among individuals (Table 1 and Figure S1 in the online supplemental materials). Four of the nine capuchins solved Phase 1 (with one level of paddles and the lowest degree of difficulty) within 60 trials, whereas three of the last five did so only after they received training trials, and two subjects did not learn the task within 150 trials. Similar variability has been reported for the same population of capuchins on a computerized maze, in which subjects required anywhere from 43 to 860 trials to reach the criterion, even at the lowest degree of difficulty (Phase 1 of their task, which was roughly equivalent to our Phase 1; Beran et al., 2015) . Finally, at the risk of inflating the meaning of an intriguing anecdote, it was the same monkey who failed to meet the criterion in both our and Beran et al.'s study, which could indicate that results across these different modalities may be highly consistent within individuals.
Although capuchins' results imply planning, we still do not know what mechanism(s) they used to solve the task. As in the study by Tecwyn et al. (2013) , it was difficult to completely rule out the possibility that subjects succeeded in the task because they simply directed the food reward toward the funnel (which was equivalent to Fragaszy et al.'s Level 2 of planning; see full discussion in the first section of this article). However, like orangutans in Tecwyn et al.'s study, our subjects used different routes from the start paddle to the goal in the trials with paths that had more than one possible route, including those with a trajectory that apparently led away from the funnel (as illustrated in Phase 4). Although we do not have sufficient data for firm conclusions, these results suggest that at least some capuchins, like chimpanzees, are capable of Level-3 planning (i.e., incorporating more than just the final location of the target; for similar results, see Fragaszy et al., 2003; Pan et al., 2011) .
The current findings add to our understanding of motor planning in capuchin monkeys and emphasize the importance of testing species in different modalities to better understand the real limits and scope of a species' ability, in this case, capuchins' planning ability. Our findings also raise some important unanswered questions concerning planning ability in primates. For example, it is still unclear what exact mechanism(s) capuchins and other species use to solve maze tasks, or why there is so much interindividual This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
variation in performance in the task (despite individuals' equivalent previous experience). Moreover, none of the maze procedures that have been used (including ours!) allows us to determine whether subjects solve maze tasks by looking forward (e.g., starting at the beginning location and plotting a path to the target), by looking backward (e.g., first locating the target and then finding the way back to the start point), or by using both strategies, either alternatively or simultaneously. More research is needed to better understand the cognitive underpinnings of planning.
